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ABSTRACT

The Dollarization Process in Mexico: 1983-1997

by
Luis J. Del Rivero
Dr. Ron M. Cronovich, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Economics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The purpose o f this study is to analyze the extent of dollarization in the Mexican
economy during the period 1983-1997. Dollarization is defined as the replacement of
domestic currency for dollars as a store of value or for transaction purposes. In this study,
a narrow definition o f dollarization will be used as an estimate of the amount o f dollars
circulating in the Mexican economy. This measure includes only the dollar-denominated
demand deposits held by businesses in Mexican banks, since the public is no longer
allowed to hold this type of accounts and a better measure for the exact amount of dollars
circulating in the Mexican economy is not available. This study will enqihasize the effects
of expected peso depreciations, peso devaluations, and political changes on the
dollarization process.

m
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Dollarization refers to using dollars instead of domestic currency as a unit of
account, store of value, or medium of exchange. High inflation and frequent currency
devaluations are factors that diminish the confidence in the domestic currency, creating an
incentive for money-holders to maintain their money balances in the currency that
depreciates least rapidly. When the confidence in the domestic money declines, money
deman ders will tend to substitute away from domestic money in favor o f more stable

foreign money. Because the U.S. dollar is a more stable currency compared to most
domestic currencies of Less Developed Countries (LDCs), it serves as an important
substitute for those domestic currencies.
The dollarization process usually evolves in a predictable manner. As domestic
inflation increases, domestic residents turn to foreign money as a store of value to avoid
the rapid depreciation o f the domestic currency. As high inflation continues, the next
stage of the dollarization process involves using dollars as a unit of account. Some prices
of “big-ticket” items begin to be quoted in foreign currency. Shortly after, some
transactions are performed in dollars, especially those involving large transfers of funds.
Whether or not dollars are ever used as more than a store of value depends on the
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government’s ability to implement credible macroeconomic policy reforms.
A brief analysis of the economic conditions of Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru in the last
two decades exemplifies the dollarization process. A feature common to these countries is
that the public was allowed to maintain Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs) in their
domestic financial system. The FCDs (demand deposits of foreign currency, usually
dollars, held by the public in domestic banks) were allowed with the objective o f inducing
the return of capital that had previously left the country due to economic instability. This
measure was either accompanied or preceded by a large devaluation and it was intended to
restore macroeconomic equilibrhun. In particular, Bolivia eliminated all restrictions on
holding FCDs in October 1973, a few months after its fixed peg system was interrupted by
a 68 percent devaluation; likewise, Mexico e liminated the restrictions in March o f 1977,
following a 37 percent devaluation in September of 1976; Peru followed in 1978, after the
sol was left to float and depreciated by more than 60 percent.
The financial reform that promoted the use of FCDs ended abruptly in the early
1980s. In all three cases the respective authorities converted the FCDs held by the private
sector into domestic money, fhis measure was originated when the dollars reserves held
by the three countries started to approach a low critical level. The amounts of dollar
reserves held were close to the point where they would not be able to cover all of the
FCDs if the investors wanted to convert them into real dollars. As a consequence, the
corresponding central banks converted all dollar-denominated debts into the domestic
currency at a rate well below the market rate. This occurred in Mexico in August 1982, in
Bolivia in October 1982, and in Peru in July o f 1985. The reimposition of controls on the
FCDs was accompanied by a large devaluation and the reinstitution of a fixed exchange
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rate in all three cases. In Mexico, this measure was one of the last taken by President
Lopez Portillo, while in Peru it was one measure taken by President Garcia during his first
address to Congress. Before 1982, during most of the ten years of reform in Bolivia, the
ratio o f FCDs to M2 was less than 20 percent, reaching 40 percent in October 1982. In
comparison, the ratio of FCDs to M2 in Mexico was less than 5 percent until 1977, and
reached 36 percent in June 1982. In contrast, the ratio in Peru grew steadily since 1978
reaching 50 percent by mid-1982 and more than 100 percent by December 1984.
The dollarization process has persisted in the Latin American countries despite
wide fluctuations in inflation. According to Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), when
inflation increases, dollarization also increases, but when inflation starts to decrease,
dollarization tends to remain constant unless the appropriate credible economic policies
are established. In Bolivia, dollarization was relatively low between 1982 and 1985, at a
time when a stabilization plan was established to fight hyperinflation. Between 1985 and
1987, following the abandonment of the stabilization plan, inflation was high and
dollarization increased by 50 percent. But Wien inflation dropped to about 3-4 percent a
quarter in the mid-1990s, dollarization continued. Conversely, dollarization and inflation
in Mexico were both relatively stable in the early 1970s; however, inflation increased in
1976-77 after the 1976 devaluation while the process of dollarization accelerated. But
when inflation fell back, the level of dollarization did not follow. It remained stable until
1981, when inflation and dollarization rose again. In Peru, even though inflation
fluctuated widely, dollarization continued to increase fi'om less than 5 percent in 1978 to
over 50 percent by the end o f 1984.
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In this study, the focus will be on the dollarization process in the Mexican
economy in the period after the forced de-dollarization of 1982. The impact of inflation,
currency devaluation, and political instability on the degree of dollarization will be
analyzed. Following previous studies, a narrow definition of dollarization will be used that
includes the dollar-denominated demand deposits held by businesses only, since the public
is no longer allowed to hold this type of accounts and no other measure exist of the
amount o f dollars circulating in the economy.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
historical perspective of the Mexican economy. Chapter 3 contains a review of the
literature. Chapter 4 provides the empirical model and the data used. Chapter 5 provides
the empirical results, and the final chapter provides concluding remarks and policy
recommendations.
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CHAPTER!

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Throughout the twentieth century the Mexican economy has been subject to many
economic transformations. Economic events ranging from stagnation, triple-digit
inflation, double-digit unemployment, frequent devaluations, and foreign capital flights, to
steady growth, single-digit inflation and single-digit unemployment, currency
appreciations, and capital accumulation, have all occurred in Mexico, sometimes even in
the same year. This chapter presents a brief historical review of the economic events of
the last few decades and their association with the process of dollarization.
Foreign currency deposits have coexisted with peso deposits in Mexico even
before the creation of the Banco de Mexico in 1925. The ratio of dollar to peso demand
deposits fell consistently during the first fixed exchange rate period from 1933 to 1938.
At the end o f 1937. less than 6 percent of the checking deposits were in dollars. In March
of 1938. President Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the oü industry and allowed the peso to
float. The dollar to peso deposit ratio reached over 15 percent in 1940 and it did not
decline until 1944 when it reached 6 percent following the establishment of the fixed
exchange rate. Inflation averaged over 10 percent between 1940 and 1954 (the ‘take-off”
period), entailing a more than doubling of the peso-dollar exchange rate, affected by two
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devaluations in 1948 and 1954. During this period, the dollarization ratio increased from
7.5 to 11.5 percent. The exchange rate of 8.65 pesos per dollar lasted until 1954 when the
peso was devaluated again 45 percent.
From 1954 to 1970 (the “stabilizing growth” period), the Mexican economy was
characterized by the highest rate o f output growth and lowest rate of inflation in Mexican
history. The exchange rate remained unchanged at 12.5 pesos per dollar throughout this
period. Domestic capital formation was favored by direct government involvement in
major industries, as well as fiscal incentives for both domestic and foreign private
investment. During this period, after the devaluation of 1954, the dollarization ratio
increased and stabilized aroimd 20 to 25 percent in 1956. It increased again in 1957
reaching 30 percent at the end of 1958. The ratio declined in 1959 all throughout the
sixties and early seventies. In 1973 inflation accelerated , the external deficit increased,
and by the end of the Echeverria presidency in 1976 the exchange rate had to be
devaluated. Once more the dollarization ratio increased.
Throughout the Presidencies of Lopez Portillo and De La Madrid Hurtado, 19771988 (the ‘Tragic Dozen” period), the government embarked on a policy of aggressive
deficit spending and monetary expansion. Accelerating inflation and a fixed nominal
exchange rate entailed a rapid real appreciation of the peso. As oil prices weakened,
foreign hank lending to Mexico shrank rapidly and private capital flight increased in
anticipation of another devaluation. As a result, the process of dollarization accelerated.
From 1977 to 1981, the ratio of dollars to pesos in Mexican banks fluctuated between 25
and 35 percent. It remained stable until 1981 when inflation and dollarization climbed
again. In 1982 it reached a peak o f 58 percent followed by a precipitous drop at the end
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of the year. This drop was mainly due to the forced de-dollarization policy.
In August 1982, Mexico froze dollar-denominated deposits in Mexican banks and
required that they be converted into Mexican pesos at a controlled exchange rate (70 to
the dollar, well below the market rate). These government restrictions increased the costs
of transacting in dollars Wiich caused a higher demand for domestic money than otherwise
would exist. Nevertheless, the government was not able to effectively prohibit domestic
citizen’s use of dollars. Dollars have continued to circulate, even if only clandestinely.
Dollar-denominated deposits were allowed in Mexico once again after the period
of forced de-dollarization, but only in special cases like for example large exports and
imports business who needed to deal in dollars. Besides these special cases, private
individuals were not allowed to have dollar-denominated deposits.
At the end of 1982, the annual inflation rate approached 100 percent accompanied
by large fiscal and trade deficits and high interest rates in international markets. With the
establishment o f several stabilization programs, inflation was reduced to about 60 percent
in 1984 (see Figure 1). However, international oü prices dropped dramatically in late
1985, rapidly increasing peso prices of imports and depressing real incomes. This led to
accelerating inflation above 100 percent (160 percent in 1987), and negative real deposit
rates. When the U.S. and Mexican stock market crashed in October 1987, the Mexican
currency suffered again, a devaluation and a massive outflow o f capital were the
consequences. Starting in 1988, a crawling peg was implemented with a preaimounced
rate of peso depreciation. Inflation fell from three-digit levels in 1988 to about 7 percent
in 1994. It was accompanied by large capital inflows from 1990 to 1994, and by a
significant appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Real Exchange Rate (Pesos per Dollar).
In December 20, 1994, large current account deficits, real appreciation of the peso,
and political instability forced the government to devaluate the peso 15 percent. Two days
later the peso was allowed to float fi-eely, falling 30 percent more. Although, data on the
amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy during these later periods of
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economic instability is not available, one can assume that the ratio of dollars to pesos in
the economy increased after the peso crisis. Figure 3 shows the changes in the ratio of
dollar-denominated to peso-denominated demand deposits as an estimate for the true
dollarization ratio.
Tlie previous historical review shows an interesting coincidence. The different
dates in which large increases in dollarization were experienced, 1940, 1952, 1958, 1976,
1982. and 1994 correspond also to the last year of a presidential administration, while
peso devaluations also occurred in 1954, 1976, 1982, 1987, and 1994. It seems that
besides inflation, both devaluation expectations and perceptions of possible political
instability associated with the replacement of the administration are important factors in
explaining the historical development of the Mexican dollarization process.
DOLLARIZATION RATIO ( 1983-1997)
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Figure 3. Dollarization Ratio.
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CHAPTERS

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The phenomenon of dollarization has been extensively analyzed in the literature. A
co m m on

characteristic of previous studies is the use of the ratio of dollar-denominated to

peso- denominated currency deposits in peso terms as an estimate of the degree of
dollarization during the years when these deposits were allowed. Some of these studies
include Clements and Schwartz ( 1993), Rojas-Suarez ( 1992), Rogers ( 1992), Ortiz
( 1983).

and Savastano ( 1992).
Savastano ( 1992), provided an overview of the main features of the 'dollarization '

process experienced by Bolivia, Mexico, Pern, and Uruguay in the past two decades. He
concluded that the creation of Foreign Currency Deposits (PCD) with the objective of
improving the external position of the central bank or encouraging financial intermediation
tends to increase the flight of domestic money which eventually reduces the residents’
holdings of domestic money balances making more difficult the conduct of monetary
policies. Furthermore, Sahay and Vegh (1995), showed that fighting dollarization with
artificial measures, such as forcing the conversion of foreign assets into domestic assets,
merely contributes to magnifying the eventual inflationary explosion. Dollarization is one
of the consequences and not the cause of existing fiscal and monetary disequilibria that are

10
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manifested in chronic fiscal deficits and accommodative monetary and exchange rate
policy.
Additionally, studies by Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985) and Ortiz ( 1983 ) concluded that
the ratio o f MexdoUars (dollar-denominated demand deposits) to pesos demand deposits
increases as depreciation expectations begin to aggravate. In contrast, Rogers ( 1992)
estimated the demand for U.S. dollars relative to domestic currency in both Mexico and
Canada. He found that in the Mexican case a negative and significant correlation exist
between the ratio of Mexdollars to pesos-denominated demand deposits, as a restrictive
measure of the degree of dollarization, and the expected rate of depreciation of the peso.
This correlation is explained by the investors’ understanding that when dollar reserves
approach a low critical level the government expects the investors to withdraw fi’om their
Mexdollar accounts, so it reacts by converting Mexdollars into pesos. The investors then
precipitate a run on Mexdollars as central bank reserves run low. Because this process
corresponds to periods in which the peso is expected to devaluate, higher expected
depreciation is associated with a lower relative demand for Mexdollars. These conflicting
results might be explained by lookmg at the time period in which the studies were
conducted. Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985) and Ortiz ( 1983) used samples that included data
previous to the forced de-dollarization of 1982 when money holders did not expect the dedollarization pohcy to ever happen. In contrast, Rogers (1992) included data of several
years after the forced de-dollarization, when money holders were already aware that the
de-dollarization policy could happen again if the government considered to be appropriate
and inflation was high enough.
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Using a different approach, Melvin and Ladman (1991) investigated whether
dollarization o f some Latin American coimtries can be attributed to the illicit drug trade
where business is conducted using dollars. Using the data on informal loans of the
Cochabamba Upper Valley in Bolivia, they found that the effects o f the term and size of
loans is consistent with the financial needs o f the drug industry which is highly dollarized.
This demonstrates that the seasonality of the coca harvest and the production of coca
paste is likely to be an important determinant of the availability of dollars to loan in
important coca-producing valleys of Bolivia.
Guidotti and Rodriguez ( 1992) stated that an economy may become more
dollarized over time in response to a high inflation level, rather than just in response to
increasing inflation. Likewise, Clements and Schwartz (1993) foimd that in Bolivia,
dollarization is Ukely to persist even if substantial policy efforts are made to reduce
inflation or increase interest rates. This occurs because of inertia factors which suggest an
asymmetry where dollarization increases rapidly with macroeconomic instability, but is
difficult to reverse even after years of macroeconomic stability. Transactions costs are
incurred by economic agents when they substitute one currency for another. Because of
these transactions costs, dollarization may not be reduced after inflation rates fall fi-om a
period of high inflation.
In addition, Melvin and Peiers (1996) analyzed the costs o f large seigniorage losses
facing domestic governments. They concluded that high transaction costs of switching
monies, dollar revenues related to illegal c o m m ercial activities, and network externalities
associated with foreign currency usage are the explanations for the observed inertia in dedollarization following domestic stabilization policies.
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Regarding the effects of expectations and credibility on the process of
dollarization, Rojas-Suarez ( 1992) found that for the case of Peru, it is appropriate to
consider if the existence of dollarization may constitute “good news” for governments
dealing with inflation by reducing the fiscal deficit and the expansion of domestic money
supply. This would depend on the credibility of the announced economic program and on
the perception o f economic agents regarding the durability of the adjustment efforts. If
the deceleration o f money growth is perceived as permanent, an increase over time of the
relative holding o f domestic money is expected. In contrast, lack of credibility may
account for the persistence of the dollarization process. Likewise, Bien ( 1990) concluded
that confidence in the national currency is an important factor when dealing with
dollarization. If little Fahh exists in the national currency, foreign currencies become an
object o f intensified stocking up, not only as a result of high inflation but also because the
person saving such currency is in a much better position than one who holds that national
currency.
Fasano (1986), cites relatively higher inflation rates and foreign exchange risk
effects as causes for holding dollars instead of the domestic currency. Exchange risk
increases when the exchange rate is floating. In the Mexican case, the relatively short
periods o f floating exchange rate and the constant intervention of the Banco de Mexico
have prevented the dollarization process fi'om increasing to even higher levels compared
to other Latin American countries. Still, the process of dollarization continues to occur to
a certain level.
Finally, Calvo and Vegh ( 1992), concluded that regarding dollarization there are
no simple policy prescriptions. On the one hand, motivating the use of the domestic
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currency gives the government extra leeway to collect taxes and to react to exogenous
shocks. This extra freedom creates excess reliance on inflation tax. On the other hand,
measures against the use of domestic currency, like fiill dollarization , may at least provide
temporary relief against inflation. However, full dollarization without a lender of last
resort may make the domestic hanking system fragile to capital flight and may lead to
possibly deep financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA

In theory, high inflation, frequent currency devaluations, and the perceptions of
“political risk” (uncertainty associated with political regime changes), are expected to
diminished the confidence on the domestic currency and create incentives for money

holders to substitute domestic currency for more stable foreign currency. The effect of
these variables is measured empirically in this chapter. The following reduced-form model
is based on a simple structural model proposed by Ortiz ( 1983) and Clements and
Schwartz (1993).' It was estimated by ordinary least squares using quarterly data from
1983:1 to 1997:4.

M R R = f (TREND, VALU E-i, VALUE-2, INFR-i, INFR-2, IN F R -j, PRES, M RR- jM R R -2 )

where the dependent and independent variables are defined as follows:
MRR: Is the dollarization ratio, measured as the ratio o f the portion dollar-denominated

'The model in this study was calculated in linear form instead of semi-log form as
in Ortiz (1983). Based on Davidson R and J. MacKhmon (1981) a test was performed
concluding that the linear form was more appropriate for this regression.
15
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demand deposits to the peso-denominated demand deposits.* ^ One-period and
two-period lags of this variable are also considered to account for the dynamic
effects of the independent variables on the dollarization ratio.
TREND: Is a linear time trend.
VALUE: Represents an estimation for the expected value of the peso with respect to the
dollar (overvalued or undervalued), measured by the deviations o f the real
exchange rate from trend.'* If the change in value is perceived as temporary, this
variable is expected to have a negative effect on the level of dollarization. As the
real exchange rate rise above its trend, the peso becomes temporarily undervalued,
so that it becomes more attractive to hold pesos instead of dollars. This variable
was obtained by using the residuals o f the following equation:
REXR=Bo + BiTREND + E
where REXR is equal to the real exchange rate obtained by the ratio o f the United
States consumer price level to the Mexican consumer price levef^ times the

"Since the public is no longer allowed to have dollar-denominated accounts and an
effective measure of the amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy does not
exist, the dollar-denominated dem and deposits includes mainly dollar-denominated
accounts held by businesses, used only for businesses purposes and not for private use. As
a result, this variable tends to underestimate the actual extent of dollarization. However,
the fluctuations of this variable should approximate the fluctuations of the real
dollarization ratio.
^Other studies have used the money demand as the dependent variable when
dealing with currency substitution; however, when dealing with dollarization, the ratio o f
MRR is a more appropriate variable.
*Ortiz ( 1983) used this variable as a proxy for foreign exchange risk.
*For estimation purposes, CPI and the inflation rate are used for both Mexico and
the U.S. with 1994 as a base year.
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nominal exchange rate of pesos per dollar. TREND is the time trend and E is the
residual.'* After some experimentation, a two-period lag structure was found to
perform adequately.
INFR; Is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate, measured by the differential
between the Mexican inflation rate and the United States inflation rate.^ **The
effect o f this variable on MRR is ambiguous. As the inflation differential increases
between Mexico and the United States, the peso is expected to depreciate more,
causing money holders to increase their holdings of dollars. However, when the
depreciation of the domestic currency is expected to increase, money holders may
withdraw from their dollar denominated accounts, because o f the fear that dollar
reserves held by the central hank will drop forcing the domestic government to
convert the dollar-denominated accounts to domestic currency at a below market
rate. A three-term lag structure o f this variable was found to perform adequately.
PRES: Is a binary dummy variable that accounts for the “political risk” factor already
mentioned. It takes the value of 1 for each of the four quarters before and the
four quarters after a Presidential election and a 0 for all other quarters. This

"The results from this regression are: REXR=5.0366 - 0.0213TREND;
R-squared=0.2188, standard errors in parenthesis. (0.1861)*** (0.0053)***
Ideally, the measure of expected nominal depreciation would be the difference
between the spot and the forward exchange rates. However, this measure was not used
for the period analyzed in this study because since 1985, Mexico n longer has a forward
exchange rate. This proxy was also used by Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985), Ortiz ( 1983), and
Guidotti and Rodriguez ( 1992).
®The changes in the CPI, are used to measure the rate of inflation for both Mexico
and the U.S.
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variable was chosen because Mexican economic history has shown that economic
changes including devaluations are more likely to occur in the year after and in the
year before a new President is elected. Hence, PRES is expected to have a
positive eftect on the level of dollarization. Uncertainty regarding the
political and economic policies of the new administration increase the risk of
holding domestic currency.
The data on Mexico (CPI, exchange rate, demand-deposhs in dollars and pesos,
and the price level) were obtained from the Banco de Mexico, Indicadores Economicos,
1997, and the data on the United States (CPI and the price level) were obtained from
various issues of International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables, the e?q)ected signs, and the
summary statistics. Between 1983 and 1997, the ratio of dollar-denominated demand
deposits to peso-denominated demand deposits (MRR) averaged 9.9%. The average
deviation of the real exchange rate from trend (VALUE) in Mexico is close to zero pesos
per dollar, and the average inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S. (INFR) is
47.13%.
Table 2 shows the correlation between the variables. In brief the dollarization
ratio MRR tends to increase when the real exchange rate of the peso is temporarily
undervalued (an increase in VALUE). Also, the dollarization ratio tends to decrease when
the peso is expected to depreciate (an increase in INFR). Finally, if the quarter in mention
is one o f the four quarters before or after a Presidential election (PRES) the dollarization
ratio tends to increase.
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Table 1. Variables Description, Expected Signs, and Descriptive Statistics
Variables (expected signs)

Definition

Mean
(standard deviation)

Dependent Variable
MRR

Ratio of dollar-denominated
to peso-denominated deposits.
A one and two lag terms of
this variable are also included
as independent variables.

0.099013
(0.05341)

Time trend.

30.50000
(17.46425)

VALUE (?)

Deviation of real exchange
rate firom trend. A one and
two-lag terms o f this variable
are also included.

0.000000
(0.706023)

INFR(?)

Inflation differential between
Mexico and the U.S. A one
through four lag terms of this
variable are also included.

47.137000
(42.78300)

PR ES(^)

= 1 for the 4 quarters before
and after a Presidential
election.

0.333333
(0.475383)

REXR

Real exchange rate, pesos per
dollar.

4.38588
(0.798327)

Independent Variables
TREND (?)
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix
Variable

MRR

TREND

VALUE

VALUE-2

V.4LU E-I

INFR

IN FR -i

MRR

1.0000

TREND

0.9480

1.0000

V.AJ,LJE

0.1131

-0.0184

1.0000

VALUE-i

0.1301

-0.0165

0.8924

1.0000

V.ALUE-2

0.1464

-0.0143

0.7545

0.8924

1.0000

INFR

-0.4543

-0.5815

0.5438

0.6425

0.6854

1.0000

[N FR -i

-0.4506

-0.5883

0.4269

0.5394

0.6382

0.9533

1.0000

INFR-2

-0.4604

-0.6007

0.3142

0.4194

0.5316

0.8450

0.9532

INFR-3

-0.4899

-0.6173

0.2033

0.3049

0.4098

0.7071

0.8456

INFR-»

-0.5248

-0.6310

0.1102

0.1972

0.2986

0.5687

0.7107

PRES

0.2574

0.1565

0.0782

0.0312

0.0187

0.0002

0.0668

M RR-i

0.9860

0.9551

0.0705

0.1148

0.1304

-0.4791

-0.4624

MRR-2

0.9657

0.9625

0.0247

0.0730

0.1155

-0.5159

-0.4867

Table 2. Continuation.
Variable

INFR-2

INFR-3

INFR-J

PRES

MRR-1

INFR-2

1.0000

INFR-3

0.9539

1.0000

1NFR-»

0.8491

0.9552

1.0000

PRES

0.1247

0.1755

0.2228

1.0000

MRR-1

-0.4647

-0.4788

-0.5051

0.2209

1.0000

MRR-2

-0.4759

-0.4824

-0.4939

0.1737

0.9864
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MRR-2

1.0000

CHAPTERS

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 3 presents the results o f four different specifications of the model discussed
in Chapter 4. Since the signs and magnitude of the coefficients are consistent across
specification. F-test were conducted on the different regressions helping to conclude that
the MODEL ( I ) was the better one to use. Therefore, the focus will be on this first
regression. The results fi'om this regression are consistent with the predictions o f the
dollarization theory.’ Nevertheless, since the regression includes one and two lagged
terms of the dependent variable as independent variables, the effect of changes in the
independent variables on MRR will persist longer than the period in which they occur.
The variable VALUE represents changes o f the real exchange rate firom its long
term trend. An increase in this variable means the peso is temporarily undervalued.
VALUE-1 has a negative sign and it is statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition.
VALUE-2 has positive sign and it is statistically significant at the 1% level

’Unit root tests were performed on the data series. The null hypothesis o f
nonstationarity could not be rejected at the 5% level o f significance. However, since the
sample size is relatively small and the regression used in this study is similar to the
standard regression used in the literature, this regression was not modified to deal with
nonstationarity.
21
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Table 3 Empirical Results
v a r ia b l e

MODEL (1)
( Standard Error'®)

MODEL (2)
(Standard Error)

MODEL (3)
(Standard Error)

MODEL (4)
(Standard Error)

CONSTANT

0.011614
(0.005063)-»*

0.013637
( 0.005623)**

0.014514
(0.006221)**

0.004706
(0.006402)

TREND

0.000953
(0.000285)***

0.000903
(0.000295)***

0.000433
(0.000291)

0.000642
(0.000296)**
0.005731
(0.003278)*

VALUE

VALUE-i

-0.006046
(0.003331)*

-0.005961
(0.003483)*

-0.001433
(0.003584)

-0.012906
(0.004618)***

VALUE-:

0.015426
(0.004140)***

0.015657
(0.004346)***

0.008914
(0.004319)**

0.012143
(0.004338)***
0.000235
(0.000111)**

INFR

[NFR-i

-0.000423
(0.000119)***

-0.000426
(0.0000121)***

-0.000221
(0.000118)*

-0.000574
(0.000158)***

[NFR-2

0.000503
(0.000163)***

0.000457
(0.00176)**

0.000190
(0.000175)

0.000422
(0.000174)»*

INFR-3

-0.000241
(0.0000887)***

-0.000145
(0.000163)

-0.00000727
(0.000175)

-0.0000936
(0.000156)

-0.0000665
(0.0000914)

-0.000115
(0.000100)

-0.0000503
(0.0000870)

[NFR-J

PRES

0.005781
(0.002215)*

0.006310
(0.002330)***

0.007494
(0.002553)***

0.004561
(0.002303)*

MRR-i

1.207205
(0.135834)***

1.178948
(0.141455)***

0.767946
(0.088052)***

1.178864
(0.134196)***

MRR-2

-0.602668
(0.154275)***

-0.568272
(0.161774)***

“Level of significance: ***= 1%;**=5%;*= 10%.
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-0.428905
(0.161581)**

Table 3. Continuation.
MODEL (1)

MODEL (2)

MODEL (3)

MODEL (4)

R-squared=

0.9837

0.9831

0.9788

0.9854

Adj. R-squared=

0.9809

0.9796

0.9750

0.9817

D-W=

2.0719

1.9825

1.3708

1.9755

Durbin-h=

0.0282***

0.0683***

155*

104*

SEE=

0.002885

0.002841

0.003713

0.002449

F-stat.=

343.8579***

285.4252***

2816008***

265.2624***

5.0436**

Breusch-Godfrey= 4.9898**

61

60

Observations=

12325*
60

60

The explanation behind the negative coefficient of VALLTE-i is that if the peso is
undervaluated temporarily in the previous quarter, MRR will decrease by 6.046% in the
present quarter, holding everything else constant. However, it is more difficult to attach a
sensible interpretation to the coefficient of VALUE-z, because o f the inclusion of MRR
lagged one and two periods as independent variables. Therefore, to gauge the impact of
VALUE on MRR, consider Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Effect o f a Four Quarter Temporary Increase in the Deviation of the Real
Exchange Rate from Trend on the Dollarization Ratio.
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Figure 4 presents the effects of a four quarter one peso per dollar increase in
deviation of the real exchange rate from its long-term trend (VALUE) on MRR. ‘‘ The
vertical axis represents the impact on MRR and the horizontal axis represents the quarters
over which the effect spreads. The VALUE variable has a negative effect on MRR in the
first quarter of the increase, hut the effect is positive after that for several quarters. In
fact, it takes over twelve quarters for the effect on MRR to decrease to zero. The theory
behind the negative effect on MRR in the first quarter is that when the peso devaluates
temporarily, it becomes more attractive to money holders which leads to a decrease in
MRR. Furthermore, the intuition that supports the positive effect on MRR, after the first
quarter of the temporary devaluation, is explained by the money holders’ reaction to
uncertainty regarding how long the peso is going to be undervaluated. Therefore, if the
deviation from trend lasts longer than a quarter, money holders become more cautious
about holding pesos. The peso becomes less attractive than before and this leads to an
increase in MRR. which last for several more quarters.
The inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S., as a proxy for expected
peso depreciation (INFR), has a negative total effect on MRR. An increase in this variable
means that the peso is expected to depreciate in relation to the dollar. The coefficient of
INFR-1 is negative and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the
coefficient of INFR-2 is positive and it is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The
interpretation of the coefficient of INFR t, is that if the inflatio n differential increases by

“ This graph is constructed from the estimated coefficients on VALUE-i,
VALUE-2 , MRR I , and MRR 2 , similar to an impulse response fimction in time series
analysis.
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1%, MRR would decrease by 0.423%, holding everything else constant. The intuition is
that as the inflation differential increases, money holders become suspicious about the
government’s reaction towards the inflation increase. Therefore, as a precaution, afi-aid
that the government might exchange their dollar-denominated deposits for pesos at a rate
below market as it previously did in 1982, money holders reduce their dollar-denominated
deposits. This action leads to a decrease in MRR. Because of the form in which the
regression is constructed, it is more difficult to assign a specific interpretation to the
coefficient of INFR-2 . Therefore, it is necessary to look at Figure 5 and Figure 6 to
measure the total long-term impact of INFR on MRR. “ The effect o f a 40% four quarter
temporary increase in the inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S. is presented in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Effect of a Four Quarter Forty Percent Temporary Increase in the Inflation
Differential on the Dollarization Ratio.

'‘A 40% increase is used because this number is close to the standard deviation of
INFR.
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According to Figure 5. the effect of a four quarter 40% increase in the inflation
differential on MRR is spread over several quarters. The effect is negative over the first
four quarters after the increase, but then it is positive to a smaller extent over the next four
quarters. In sum. it takes over ten quarters for the effect on MRR to be reduced to zero.
The theory behind the negative effect of the increase in INFR is that money holders reduce
their dollar-denominated deposits as a precautionary reaction to the uncertainty regarding
the government's policies towards the inflation increase, which leads to a decrease in
MRR (though not necessarily a decrease in the dollar holdings outside the banks).
Additionally, the theory behind the positive effect of the increase in the inflation
differential on MRR after four quarters, is that after the increase in INFR has continued
for a few quarters, the peso has depreciated, and if the government has not reacted with a
de-dollarization policy, pesos become less attractive and money holders start to exchange
back their peso holdings for dollars which leads to an increase in MRR. In similar manner,
the effect of a 40% permanent increase in INFR is presented in Figure 6.
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Figime 6. Effect o f a Forty Percent Permanent Increase in the Inflation Differential on the
Dollarization Ratio.
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The effect of a permanent increase o f 40% in the inflation differential as shown in
Figure 6. is a permanent decrease in MRR of about 1.5%. The results fi'om the increase in
the inflation differential are not consistent with the dollarization theory. The dollarization
ratio was expected to increase as the inflation differential increases. However, when the
inflation in Mexico increases in relation to the inflation in the U.S.. dollar holdings
decrease permanently due to a precautionary reaction by the money holders, which leads
to a decrease in MRR. This does not mean that the tme dollarization ratio has declined.
As expected, the effect o f a Presidential election (PRES) as a measure of “political
risk”, on MRR is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level o f significance. In
this case, it is also necessary to refer to Figure 7 to better judge the long-term impact of
PRES on MRR.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN QUARTER FIVE

1.5
LU
o
z
<
X
o
X
X
2

1

MRR

0.5
0
-0.5
-1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

QUARTERS

Figure 7. Effect of a Presidential Election on the Dollarization Ratio.
Figure 7 shows that when a Presidential election has occurred or is going to occur,
MRR increases starting four quarters before the election, and increases even more for four
quarters after the election. The effect decreases for several quarters after, but it does not
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decrease to zero until more than twelve quarters after the election quarter. This positive
effect on MRR is due to the uncertainty regarding governmental changes and the new
political policies which can affect the domestic currency.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of inflation rates, exchange
rates, and political instability on the process of dollarization with respect to the Mexican
economy. The findings suggest that money demanders are sensitive to changes in
inflation, risk of forced de-dollarization, the degree of over or undervaluation of the peso,
and political changes. This phenomenon is comm on in Latin America.
Although, in theory Mexico ended the use of dollar denominated bank accounts to
the public in August 1982, the use of dollar currency is still prevalent. As long as inflation
rates continue to be higher relative to the inflation in the United States, and fears that the
peso might lose its value exists in the money holders’ mind, along with poUtical instability,
dollarization will continue to be an issue in Mexico, even though it cannot be measured
with complete precision.
Reversing the dollarization process requires domestic currency to be a better
alternative. Credible economic reforms that provide a manageable inflation rate and
prevent continuous currency devaluations are needed along with programs that can help to
increase the confidence in the political system These will help to reduce the dollarization
process and also give the control o f monetary policy back to the domestic government.

29
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The model of dollarization presented here is still exploratory and can be improved
for future research. Future research should focus on understanding the microfoundations
of currency substitution and expectation formation. Additionally, the nonstationarity of
the available data should be explored further for even better results. Similarly, the lack of
data on the amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy is in itself a great
obstacle to measure with accuracy the effects that the variables already mentioned have on
the true dollarization ratio.
Dollarization is a rational response by economic agents to continuous instability in
the value of the domestic currency. Hence, central bank policies aimed at restricting or
increasing the cost of dollarization may delay the process, but are unlikely to end it.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bien. Witold. “Currency Dollarization and Unbalanced Economy.” Soviet and Eastern
European Foreign Trade 27 (Summer 1991): 68-83.
Banco de Mexico. Indicadores Economicos (Various issues)
Calvo. Guillermo A And Carlos A Vegh. ‘Currency Substitution in Developing
Countries: an Introduction.” Revista de Analisis Economico 17 (June 1992): 3-27.
Clements. Benedict and Gerd Schwartz. ‘Currency Substitution: The Recent Experience
of Bolivia” World Development 21 ( 1993): 1883-1893.
Davidson R. and J. MacKinnon. “Several Test for Model Specification in the Presence of
Alternative Hypothesis.” Econometrica 49 (1981).
Fasano-Filho. Ugo. Currency Substitution and the Demand for Money: The Argentine
Case, 1960-1976.” Weltwirstchaftliches-Archiv. 22 (September 1986).
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. (Various issues).
Guidotti, Pablo E. and Carlos A Rodriguez. “Dollarization in Latin America.” IMF Staff
Papers. 39 (September 1992): 518-544.
Melvin, Michael and Jerry 1 adman Coca Dollars and the Dollarization of South
America.” Journal of Money Credit and Ranking 23 (November 1991): 752-763.
Melvin. Michael and Bettina Peiers. Dollarization in Developing Countries: Rational
Remedy or Domestic Dilemma? ” Contemporary Economic Policv 14 (July 1996):
30-40.
Ortiz, Guillermo. ‘Currency Substitution in Mexico The Dollarization Problem” Journal
of Monev Credit and Ranking 15 (May 1983); 174-185.
Ramirez-Rojas, C. L. ‘Currency Substitution in Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay.” IMF
Staff Papers 32 (December 1985): 629-667.
31

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo. “Money and Credit Under Currency Substitution.” IMF Staff"
Papers 40 (June 1993): 414-426.
Rogers, John H. “The Currency Sunstitution Hypothesis and the Relative Money Demand
in Mexico and Canada.” Journal o f Monev. Credit and Banking 24 (August 1992):
300-318.
Rogers. John H. “Convertibility Risk and Dollarization in Mexico: A
Vectorautoregressive Analysis.” Journal of International Money and Finance 11
(April 1992): 188-207.
Rojas-Suarez. Liliana. “Currency Substitution and Inflation in Peru.” Revista de Analvsis
Economico 7 (June 1992): 153-176.
Sahay, Ratna and Carlos A, Vegh. ‘Dollarization in Transition Economies. ' Finance and
Development 32 (March 1995): 36-39.
Savastano, Miguel A “The Pattern of Currency Substitution in Latin America: An Overview.”
Revista de Analisis Economico 7 (June 1992): 29-72.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

VITA
Graduate College
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Luis J. Del Rivero

Local Address;
4209 South Bruce Street
Las Vegas, NV 89119
Home Address;
4209 South Bruce Street
Las Vegas, NV 89119
Degree:
Bachelor o f Science, Business Management, 1995
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Dissertation/Thesis Title: The Dollarization Process in Mexico: 1983-1997
Dissertation/Tli * - Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Ronald M. Cronovich, Ph D.
C ommitte e Member, Dr. Djeto Assane, Ph D.
Committee Member, Dr. Bernard Malamud, Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Melvin H. Jameson, Ph.D.

33

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET ( Q A -3 )

/

%
VL

1.0
L4 K â

mil 2 .2

2.0

l.l
1.8

1.25

1.4

1.6

150mm

V
cP7.
/4 P P L IE D A IMTIGE . in c
- =

■/,.
- = ~ - =

f;

16 5 3 E a s t M ain S treet
R o c h e s te r, NY 14609 U SA
P h o n e : 7 1 6 /4 82-0300
F æ c 7 1 6 /2 8 8 -5 9 8 9

0 1993, Applied Image. Inc.. Ail Rights Reserved

o

/

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

